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Abstract
In December 2011, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of JPMorgan Chase
(JPM) instructed the bank’s Chief Investment Office to reduce the size of its Synthetic Credit
Portfolio (SCP) during 2012, so that JPM could decrease its Risk-Weighted Assets as the bank
prepared to adopt the impending Basel III bank capital regulations. However, the SCP traders
were also told to minimize the trading costs incurred to reduce Risk-Weighted Assets, while
still maintaining the opportunity to profit from unexpected corporate bankruptcies. In an
attempt to balance these competing objectives, head SCP derivatives trader Bruno Iksil
suggested in January 2012 that the SCP expand a strategy first implemented in 2011 to buy
large volumes of certain credit derivatives while simultaneously selling large volumes of
other credit derivatives. The strategy quickly proved unsuccessful, and JPM’s Chief
Investment Officer ordered Iksil and the other SCP traders to halt this strategy on March 23.
However, losses continued to mount as the credit-derivative positions were unwound,
ultimately reaching $6.2 billion by December 2012.

__________________________________________________________________
___
This case study is one of nine produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) examining issues
related to the JPMorgan Chase London Whale. The following are the other case studies in this case series:
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale A: Risky Business
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, and Models
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale D: Risk-Management Practices
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale E: Supervisory Oversight
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation.
Cases are available at the Journal of Financial Crises, Vol. 1 (2019), Iss. 2.
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1. Introduction
On April 6, 2012, Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal published the first news stories
about a mysterious derivatives trader known as the “London Whale.” The trader in question,
Bruno Iksil, worked in the London office of the largest United States (US) bank holding
company, JPMorgan Chase & Company (JPM). In response, bank officials maintained that
Iksil’s trading activities were not focused on short-term profits but were instead used to help
JPM hedge certain of its structural risks. However, the articles questioned whether Iksil’s
derivative bets were so large that he was in fact exposing the bank to more risk.
JPM released its preliminary earnings results for the first quarter of 2012 just a week later
on April 13, and Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon assured investors and analysts on the
conference call that the matter was just a “tempest in a teapot,” though evidence would later
reveal that Iksil’s failed trading strategy had lost over $1 billion by this date.
The bank set up an internal task force in early May to investigate the losses. When JPM
reported its final first-quarter financial results on May 10, Dimon acknowledged that the
Chief Investment Office (CIO), the unit in which Iksil worked, had taken on more risk than
previously thought because a recently implemented risk-measurement model had been
inadequate. At the same time, several of JPM’s counterparties disputed the amount of
collateral that had been assigned to Iksil’s credit-derivative contracts, thus raising doubts
whether the CIO was complying with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles when
estimating the fair value of its derivatives.
The US Senate began holdings hearings into the matter in June and launched a formal
investigation in July. This investigation resulted in a 300-page report in March 2013,
accompanied by an additional 600 pages of supporting exhibits. The internal JPM task force
also released its own 130-page report in early 2013. Both of these reports detailed the flaws
in Iksil’s trading strategy, the violation of proper accounting treatment for the credit
derivatives in question, and the failures in JPM’s risk-management system that allowed the
losses and the accounting irregularities to occur.
Though CIO senior management halted Iksil’s trading in March 2012, before the Bloomberg
and Wall Street Journal articles were even published, the bank needed the rest of the year to
unwind the credit derivatives trading book. Market losses continued to escalate, finally
totaling $6.2 billion by December, as other investors were aware of the size and composition
of JPM’s derivatives holdings and traded against the firm as a result.
As a global-diversified financial services firm, JPM is supervised by many different regulatory
agencies, both in the US and internationally. These regulators later admitted to having been
surprised when they first saw the April 6 articles, and they penalized JPM for its regulatory
violations. JPM settled these charges in fall 2013 for a total penalty of $1.02 billion, including
admitting wrongdoing in certain circumstances. (See Figure 1.)
The remainder of this overview case study is organized as follows. Sections 2, 3, and 4
provide background on JPM, the bank’s Chief Investment Office, and credit default swaps,
respectively. Section 5 summarizes the other case studies. See Appendix 1 for a timeline of
key events and Appendix 2 for an organizational chart of key players.
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Figure 1: JPM Settlements with Regulators
Date

Amount

Regulator/Supervisor

September 19,
2013

£ 137.6 million **

(UK) Financial Conduct Authority

September 19,
2013

$ 200 million

(US) Federal Reserve Board

September 19,
2013

$ 300 million

(US) Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

September 19,
2013

$ 200 million

(US) Securities and Exchange Commission

October 26, 2013

$ 100 million

(US) Commodity Futures Trading Commission

** About $220 million.
Source: Project Editor Notes.

2. The Bank: JPMorgan Chase & Company
New York banker John Pierpont Morgan and Philadelphia banker Anthony Drexel founded
the firm of Drexel, Morgan & Company in New York City in 1871. The bank grew over the
years, both organically and via many acquisitions, eventually absorbing over 1,000
predecessor financial institutions, the oldest of which dates back to 1799. By December
2011, what is now known as JPMorgan Chase & Company had grown to become the largest
bank holding company in the US, with 260,000 employees, $19 billion of net income, $97
billion of total net revenue, $184 billion in total stockholders’ equity, and $2.3 trillion in total
assets (JPM 10-K 2011, 62). According to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, the only other US bank holding company with total assets over $2 trillion at that
date was Bank of America.
JPM is incorporated under Delaware law and continues to maintain its headquarters in New
York City, New York. JPM has two primary national bank subsidiaries: JPMorgan Chase Bank,
which is a commercial bank with branches in 23 US states, and Chase Bank USA, which
specializes in credit cards. JPM’s main non-bank subsidiary is JPMorgan Securities, which is
an investment banking firm (JPM 10-K 2011, 1).
The holding company is managed on a line-of-business basis with six reportable segments.
(See Figure 2). In addition, JPM maintains a “Corporate/Private Equity” function that
includes the firm’s internal treasury department, a private equity group, the Chief
Investment Office, corporate staff units, and other centrally managed expenses (JPM 10-K
2011, 1, 79 and 107).
As can be seen in Figure 1, JPM is supervised by numerous government agencies. The Federal
Reserve Board acts as an “umbrella regulator” of the holding-company structure. Among
other financial regulators, the national bank subsidiaries are primarily regulated by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; JPMorgan Securities is regulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission; and the firm’s use of derivatives is regulated by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission. As a global financial services firm, JPM is also supervised by
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international regulators, including the Financial Services Authority, which was the sole
financial regulator in the United Kingdom (UK) during the relevant 2011-12 time period.
Figure 2: JPM Lines of Business
Wholesale Businesses
Investment Banking
Commercial Banking
Treasury and Security Services
Asset Management
Consumer Businesses
Retail Financial Services
Card Services and Auto
Source: Project Editor Notes.
Jamie Dimon has been the public face of JPM since becoming the bank’s Chief Executive
Officer in December 2005 and Chairman of the Board in December 2006. Dimon’s salary and
incentive compensation totaled $23 million in both 2010 and 2011 (JPM Proxy 2012, 4 and
20). Douglas Braunstein served as JPM’s Chief Financial Officer from June 2010 through
December 2012, at which time he became Vice Chairman. Barry Zubrow had served as JPM’s
Chief Risk Officer since November 2007, before becoming Head of Corporate and Regulatory
Affairs in January 2012 (and subsequently retiring in 2013). Zubrow was succeeded as Chief
Risk Officer by John Hogan (JPM Task Force 2013, 18-19).

3. The Unit: Chief Investment Office
JPM separated its Chief Investment Office (CIO) from its Treasury unit in 2005, with CIO
becoming a separate unit within the bank. As noted in Section 2, CIO was part of the bank’s
Corporate/Private Equity function, rather than part of the reportable business segments. By
year-end 2011, CIO had 428 employees based in New York and London, consisting of 140
front-office traders and 288 middle- and back-office staff (JPM Task Force 2013, 21).
JPM provides a wide variety of financial services, yet its commercial bank subsidiaries
continue to engage in the basic banking functions of taking deposits and making loans. In
recent years, the amount of deposits held by JPM on behalf of its customers was consistently
greater than the amount of money loaned by the bank. (Note that we refer to the difference
between deposits and loans as “excess deposits” herein and in the other case studies.)
For example, as can be seen in Figure 3, JPM had $1.128 trillion of deposits payable to
customers at December 31, 2011, but only $724 billion of loan balances receivable, resulting
in excess deposits of about $400 billion.
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Figure 3: JPMorgan Chase Deposit and Loan Balances as of December 31

Source: JPM 10-K 2011, 62.
By definition, JPM had not loaned out this money, so the bank needed a way to profitably yet
safely invest these excess deposits. This task was assigned to the CIO unit, and it was the
unit’s primary responsibility. CIO invested the bank’s excess deposits in Treasury bonds and
other investment grade (i.e., high-quality) fixed-income securities, including corporate,
municipal, and asset-backed bonds. This conservative investment approach was consistent
with how other banks managed excess deposits, and the average credit rating for CIO’s
investments was AA+.
By December 2011, CIO managed a $350 billion portfolio of fixed income securities, an
amount that was approximately double JPM’s total stockholders’ equity of $184 billion at
that date. Because this bond portfolio was funded by deposits (most of which were uninsured
corporate deposits, but part of which were covered by deposit insurance), CIO’s primary
financial regulator was the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (i.e., the primary
regulator of JPM’s national bank subsidiaries that had taken in the deposits) (US Senate
Report, 21-22).
CIO had various additional objectives, including funding JPM’s retirement plans, as well as
hedging the risks associated with interest rates and mortgage servicing rights on behalf of
other units within the bank. One of CIO’s other objectives was to partially hedge JPM’s credit
risk. Like other lenders, JPM is exposed to credit risk (also known as default risk), which is
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the risk that someone who has borrowed money from the bank is unwilling and/or unable
to repay the money when due.
The JPMorgan Chase & Company Management Task Force (JPM Task Force) charged with
internally investigating the CIO losses stated in its final report, “The Synthetic Credit
Portfolio managed by CIO was intended generally to offset some of the credit risk that
JPMorgan faces, including in its CIO investment portfolio and in its capacity as a lender” (JPM
Task Force 2013, 2). The Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP), which was the source of the CIO
losses, consisted of long and short positions in various credit default swaps and other credit
derivatives, described more fully in Section 4.
Ina Drew, who was JPM’s Chief Investment Officer, was also head of CIO from its start as a
separate unit in 2005 until her retirement in May 2012 one month after the CIO trading
losses had become public. Drew’s salary and incentive compensation was $15 million in
2010 and $14 million in 2011 (JPM Proxy 2012, 20). Her subordinate Achilles Macris ran the
CIO London office in his capacity as International Chief Investment Officer. Javier MartinArtajo directly oversaw the SCP as Head of Europe and Credit and Equity, and reported to
Macris. Bruno Iksil, the “London Whale,” was the senior trader of the SCP and reported to
Martin-Artajo. Julien Grout was a junior trader who in turn reported to Iksil. JPM fired Macris,
Martin-Artajo, and Iksil in July 2012, while suspending Grout (who subsequently resigned).
Martin-Artajo and Grout were indicted in absentia by the US Department of Justice in August
2013. Iksil had entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the US government and
accordingly was not charged.
In an internal memo dated March 31, 2014, JPM said that it would recombine the CIO and
Treasury units, which is how asset-liability management function is traditionally structured
at most banks (Braithwaite and Massoudi 2014).

4. The Derivatives: Credit Default Swaps
As noted in Section 3, CIO used the SCP to attempt to offset some of the credit risk to which
JPM was exposed. The SCP consisted of positions in credit default swap indices and related
instruments.
A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is derived from the value of some other
security. The value of a credit derivative is derived from the creditworthiness of an
underlying fixed income security, such as an asset-backed, corporate, or government bond.
One simple type of credit derivative is a credit default swap (CDS). A CDS contract is similar
to an insurance contract in certain aspects. One party to the contract sells insurance or credit
protection to the second party against the possibility that one or more borrower(s) named
in the contract default(s) on a debt, such as by filing for bankruptcy. The protection buyer
periodically pays premiums to the protection seller, similar to insurance premiums. The
protection buyer is said to be “long protection” or “short credit risk,” whereas the protection
seller is said to be “short protection” or “long credit risk.” However, unlike a typical insurance
policy, a CDS contract does not require the protection buyer to have actual exposure to the
underlying risk. In fact, a protection buyer and seller can use CDS to speculate on future
changes in creditworthiness.
The size of a CDS contract or market is measured in what is termed “notional” or “net
notional” amounts. The “notional” amount of a CDS contract is akin to the amount of
insurance coverage purchased, not the much smaller annual premium paid. For example, if
an investor pays $5 million per year to buy credit protection on a $100 million bond, the
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notional size of the contract is $100 million. The “net notional” amount reflects the difference
between long and short notional amounts.
A credit index tracks a specific basket of credit instruments, and a credit tranche tracks a
specific portion of a credit index. The main products traded by Iksil were based on the
CDX.NA.HY and CDX.NA.IG indices administered by the Markit Group Limited (Markit). Iksil
bought protection on the CDX.NA.HY, which is a credit index of 100 companies located in
North America and classified as High Yield (i.e., higher risk) based on their credit rating. He
sold protection on the CDX.NA.IG, which is a credit index of 125 companies located in North
America and classified as Investment Grade (i.e., lower risk). Iksil also carried out similar
trades on European credit indices.
Markit creates two new series of each index every year, as new bonds are issued and existing
bonds mature or default. When selling credit protection, Iksil primarily used the CDX.NA.IG9
series of the index. IG9 was created in 2007 before the height of the financial crisis, and it
included five companies that were rated as investment grade in 2007 but were later
downgraded to high-yield status, thus providing a closer offset to the CDX.NA.HY high-yield
credit protection held in the SCP book.
US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles require that credit derivatives and certain
other financial instruments be adjusted to fair value every day, with the resulting profit and
loss also being recorded on a daily basis, known as “mark-to-market” accounting. However,
unlike exchange-traded securities (for example, common stock of companies in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average), credit derivatives trade in a much smaller, less liquid dealer
market, which introduces greater uncertainty and discretion into the valuation process.
Credit derivative prices are quoted at a “bid-ask spread,” representing the prices at which
market makers are willing to buy from (at the lower bid price) or sell to (at the higher ask
price) participants who are not market makers. Less liquid securities, such as credit
derivatives, generally are quoted at wider bid-ask spreads than securities that are more
actively traded.

5. Summary of the Case Studies
JPMorgan Chase London Whale A: Risky Business
In December 2011, Dimon and Braunstein instructed CIO to reduce the size of the SCP during
2012, so that JPM could reduce its Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) as the bank prepared to
adopt the impending Basel III bank capital regulations. However, Martin-Artajo, Iksil, and
Grout were also expected to minimize the trading costs of decreasing RWA, while still
maintaining the chance to profit from unexpected corporate bankruptcies. In an attempt to
balance these multiple competing objectives, Iksil suggested in late January 2012 that SCP
expand a strategy first implemented in 2011 to buy credit protection on (higher risk) high
yield companies, while funding some of the premiums by selling protection on (lower risk)
investment-grade companies. The resulting rapid increase in trading caused the net notional
size of the SCP portfolio to triple from $51 billion at year end 2011 to $157 billion by March
31, 2012, and brought Iksil to the attention of Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal.
Unfortunately, the trading strategy was not successful, as changes in credit spreads caused
the value of protection owned by SCP to decrease more rapidly than did the value of
protection that the traders had sold. Although Drew ordered the SCP traders to halt this
strategy on March 23, losses continued to mount as the credit derivative positions were
unwound, ultimately reaching $6.2 billion by December 2012.
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JPMorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation
After consistently producing positive revenues through 2011, the SCP traders were alarmed
by a consistent string of losses beginning in January 2012. In an effort to minimize the losses
reported to their superiors until such time that market prices turned in their favor, MartinArtajo, Iksil, and Grout began valuing the largest SCP positions in a manner that was not
consistent with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and JPM policy. GAAP
requires that derivatives be adjusted to fair value each day, with the resulting gain or loss
also being recorded in a company’s accounting records. Whereas many firms choose to value
their derivatives at the midpoint between the bid price and the ask price, since this option is
offered as a safe harbor under GAAP, Grout was valuing SCP’s positions using whichever side
of the bid-ask spread was more favorable. The SCP fair values were reviewed by CIO’s own
Valuation Control Group (as required by banking regulators) and by the JPM Controller, but
neither review raised any objection to the SCP marks. However, after the JPM Task Force
uncovered evidence that the SCP traders had not estimated fair values in good faith, the bank
restated its first-quarter 2012 earnings on July 13, reducing consolidated total net revenue
by $660 million (2.5%), which in turn reduced after-tax net income by $459 million (8.5%).
JPMorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, and Models
All major financial institutions use various risk limits, metrics, and models to measure and
monitor the risk of their lending and investing activities. The amount of risk taken is
measured on a daily or weekly basis using various risk metrics, and these amounts are
compared with the relevant limits. Value at Risk (VaR) is one of the most commonly used
ways to measure and monitor market risk. VaR is an estimate of the most that one or more
financial instruments could decrease in value over a fixed time period (e.g., one day) with a
given level of confidence (e.g., 95%). After large derivative positions in the SCP book caused
the CIO to exceed not only its own VaR limit for four consecutive days in January 2012, but
also the higher firm-wide VaR limit, the CIO changed to a new VaR calculation model on
January 30, which appeared to immediately reduce CIO VaR by half. However, JPM later
discovered that the new CIO VaR model was not properly implemented and included formula
and operational errors, causing the bank to go back to using the previous model.
Furthermore, the SCP traders and their managers also disregarded several other risk metrics
during the first quarter of 2012. The only risk limit that CIO management heeded is known
as Credit Spread Widening 10% (CSW10%), which is the expected change in portfolio value
if the credit spread on each position simultaneously widened by 10% of its current amount
(e.g., from 2.00% to 2.20%). After Drew learned on March 23 that Iksil and the SCP had
breached the CIO’s mark-to-market CSW10% limit the day before, she ordered trading of the
SCP portfolio to be halted immediately.
JPMorgan Chase London Whale D: Risk-Management Practices
JPM prided itself on having the best risk management practices in the financial industry,
surviving the 2007-09 financial crisis in better shape than many of its competitors, and
Dimon often spoke of the bank’s “fortress balance sheet.” Of course, a focus on risk
management is vital to JPM’s longevity, as is the case with all highly leveraged financial
institutions. However, the JPM Task Force concluded that risk-management practices at CIO
were given less scrutiny by senior bank management than those of client-facing businesses,
despite the fact that CIO managed about $350 billion in assets, an amount almost double
JPM’s total stockholders’ equity at December 31, 2011.
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JPMorgan Chase London Whale E: Supervisory Oversight
As a diversified financial service provider and the largest US bank holding company, JPM is
supervised by multiple regulatory agencies. JPM’s commercial bank subsidiaries hold a
national charter and therefore are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC). Since the CIO invested the surplus deposits of JPM’s commercial bank units, the OCC
was also CIO’s primary regulator. During the critical period from late January through March
2012, JPM did not provide the OCC with required monthly reports that included CIO
performance data and the results of CIO’s internal reviews of the fair values assigned by
traders to their derivative positions, yet OCC failed to request the missing information.
JPMorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures
On April 13, 2012, Braunstein participated in a conference call to discuss JPM’s first-quarter
2012 earnings, commenting that the purpose of Iksil’s trading activity was to help JPM
manage losses in a stressful credit environment, that trading decisions were made on a longterm basis, that SCP positions were transparent to banking regulators and also approved by
the firm-wide risk-management function, and that SCP’s hedging function would be
allowable under the Volcker Rule. On May 10, JPM finalized its first-quarter financial results.
At issue is whether the regulatory filings on April 13 and May 10, as well as Braunstein’s and
Dimon’s verbal comments on those dates, were misleading and thus violated relevant
securities laws enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
JPMorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading
In December 2013, a handful of US regulatory agencies jointly adopted final rules to
implement Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
which is often referred to as the “Volcker Rule.” Section 619 prohibits banks from engaging
in activities often considered to be particularly risky, including using the bank’s own money
to generate trading profits (known as proprietary trading) and owning hedge funds or
private equity funds. Banking regulators designed the final prohibition against proprietary
trading in part to help prevent future trading losses like those at JPM. Given the controversial
nature of the Volcker Rule, the regulatory agencies received 18,000 comment letters,
including a 67-page letter from JPM.
JPMorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation
As a global financial service provider, JPM is supervised by banking regulatory agencies in
different countries. Iksil was based in JPM’s London office, which was regulated by both the
OCC and the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which served as the sole regulator of all
financial services in the UK. Banking regulators in the US and the UK have entered into
agreements with one another to define basic parameters for sharing information gleaned
during bank examinations and even assisting one another with bank inspections under
certain circumstances. However, the OCC apparently never requested assistance from its UK
counterpart in examining CIO’s London office even though the OCC did not assign any of its
own London staff to examine these operations. JPM misled the FSA in much the same way
that the bank misled the OCC.
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Appendix 1: Timeline of Key Events
2005

JPMorgan Chase & Company (JPM) spun off the Chief
Investment Office (CIO) as a separate unit to invest the bank’s
excess deposits. Ina Drew, JPM’s Chief Investment Officer, was
appointed head of CIO.

2006

CIO approved a proposal by Achilles Macris to trade credit
derivatives.

2007

JPM conducted the first internal audit review of “CIO Global
Credit Trading.” The final audit report noted that CIO “credit
trading activities commenced in 2006 and are proprietary
position strategies.”

2008

According to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), the CIO began calling this derivative trading the
Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP). SCP annual revenues = $170
million.

2009

SCP annual revenues = $1.050 billion.

2010

2011

June

The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the
government of the United Kingdom would overhaul the
financial regulatory framework, including abolishing the
Financial Services Authority (FSA) and splitting its functions
into two new successor agencies.

July 21

The Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law.

December
31

SCP annual revenues = $149 million. Year-end net notional =
$4 billion.

January 27

Increased trading activity in the SCP caused the CIO to exceed
its stress loss risk limit for the next seven weeks.

Midyear

Bruno Iksil and his fellow SCP traders began buying credit
protection on (higher risk) high-yield companies, while
funding some of the cost by selling protection on (lower risk)
investment-grade companies.
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October–
November

Patrick Hagan developed the new 10-Q Value at Risk (VaR)
model used by the CIO for financial reporting.

November
7

Dynegy filed for bankruptcy.

November
29

American Airlines filed for bankruptcy, resulting in a $400
million to $550 million profit for SCP.

December

Jamie Dimon (Chief Executive Officer) and Douglas
Braunstein (Chief Financial Officer) instructed CIO to reduce
Risk Weighted Assets so that JPM could reduce its regulatory
capital requirements.
CIO’s one-day, five-day, and 20-day stop-loss advisory limits
were each raised from $60 million to $70 million.

2012

December
31

SCP annual revenues = $453 million. Year-end net notional =
$51 billion. CIO had 428 employees and managed a $350
billion portfolio of low-risk fixed income securities.

January

John Hogan replaced Barry Zubrow as JPM Chief Risk Officer.
Mr. Hogan appointed Irvin Goldman to be CIO’s first official
Chief Risk Officer.
CIO merged its Tactical Asset Allocation portfolio, which
included the SCP, with the Strategic Asset Allocation portfolio.

January 1

JPM 10-Q VaR limit = $125 million. CIO 10-Q VaR limit = $95
million.

January 6

CIO Credit Spread Basis Point Value (CSBPV) $5 million markto-market limit first breached; CIO remained continuously
over this limit until May.

January 16- SCP breached the VaR limit for both the CIO and JPM for four
19
days. This fact was reported to Mr. Dimon.
January 18

CIO Comprehensive Risk Measure (CRM) = $3.2 billion. JPM’s
quant team was not able to calculate CIO CRM for the next five
weeks. CIO CSBPV $12 million global limit first breached.

January 23

Dimon and Hogan approve an increase in the firm-wide VaR
from $125 million to $140 million until January 31.

January 25

CIO CSBPV $12 million global limit breached again; CIO then
remained continuously over this limit until May.

January 26

CIO meeting at which Iksil proposed expanding purchases of
credit protection on high-yield corporate bonds, while selling
even larger amounts of default protection on investmentgrade corporate bonds. The proposal was approved and
implemented immediately.
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January 27

SCP VaR = $126 million, over its temporary limit of $105
million.

January 30

Iksil expressed concern about the new strategy to his superior
Javier Martin-Artajo and suggested letting the SCP positions
expire.
CIO received JPM approval to adopt a revised VaR model,
which reduced VaR by 50%.

January 31

SCP lost money on 17 of 21 business days (81%), for a
monthly loss of $100 million.
An e-mail from Mr. Iksil to Mr. Martin-Artajo provided the
earliest evidence that the CIO had begun using unreasonably
favorable valuations for the SCP book.
OCC held a regularly-scheduled quarterly meeting with John
Wilmot (CIO Chief Financial Officer), who indicated that CIO
Risk Weighted Assets would decrease from $70 billion to $40
billion during 2012.

February

CIO held its 2012 annual business review of risk limits.

February
13

JPM sent a letter to the OCC and other bank regulators,
expressing concern that SCP’s asset liability management
activities “during the financial crisis would have been
endangered by the proposed [Volcker] rule.”

February
22

CIO CRM = $6.3 billion, dismissed by Peter Weiland (CIO Head
of Market Risk) as “garbage.”

February
29

SCP lost money on 15 of 21 business days (71%), for a
monthly loss of $69 million.

March 12- Julien Grout, who reported to Iksil, prepared a spreadsheet
16
tracking the difference between daily SCP values he was
reporting and values that would have been reported using
midpoint prices. The distance between the marks was $203
million on March 12, $207 million on March 13, $269 million
on March 14, $498 million on March 15, and either $432 or
$499 million on March 16 (both amounts shown).
March 15

Iksil asked Mr. Grout to e-mail the spreadsheet to MartinArtajo.

March 22

SCP breached the CSW10% limit, which was considered by
Drew to be the most important risk limit.

March 23

Drew ordered the CIO traders to stop trading the SCP.

March 28

CIO Risk Committee held its first meeting of 2012.
FSA held a quarterly supervisory meeting with JPM.
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March 29

SCP caused CIO’s stress loss limits to be exceeded.

March 30

Last trading day of the first quarter.
SCP lost money on 16 of 22 business days (73%), for a
monthly loss of $550 million.
JPM’s Internal Audit group released a report, stating that CIO
Valuation Control Group (CIO VCG) “needs improvement.”
Macris e-mailed Hogan that he had “lost confidence” in his
team and requested help.

First
Quarter

SCP lost money on 48 of 64 business days (75%), for a
quarterly loss of $719 million. Net notional increased from
$51 billion to $157 billion. Mr. Iksil and his team of SCP
traders executed over 4,300 trades, an average of almost 70
trades per day.

April 2

FSA reorganized itself internally into a so-called “twin peaks”
operating model, separating prudential and conduct
regulation.

April 4

CIO VCG completed its regular review of SCP’s March 31
marks.

April 4-5

Wall Street Journal notified CIO that it planned to publish an
article about Iksil. Drew informed the JPM Operating
Committee.

April 6

Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal published the first
news stories about the “London Whale.”

April 9

Thomas Curry took office as the 30th Comptroller of the
Currency. OCC examiners met with Ms. Drew to discuss the
media reports.

April 10

First trading day after the London Whale gained public
attention.
The initially reported SCP daily loss of $6 million was revised
upward to $395 million just 90 minutes later ($415 million
final loss reported).
JPM provided the OCC with a summary list of CIO derivative
positions, but did not include profit-and-loss data and omitted
certain derivatives.
FSA met with CIO London management for the first time since
the media stories. CIO management did not inform the FSA
that cumulative losses from the SCP book were more than
$700 million during the first quarter and were expected to
and in fact did exceed $1 billion by the end of the trading day.
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April 11

Mr. Wilmot sent an analysis to Mr. Dimon and Mr. Braunstein
showing that the SCP would lose money if credit spreads
widened in anticipation of increased defaults.

April 13

JPM filed a Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) that included the bank’s first quarter 2012
earnings release, appearing to show that average CIO VaR
barely changed from $69 million during the fourth quarter of
2011 to $67 million during the first quarter of 2012. The
earnings release made no mention of the change in CIO’s VaR
model.
On the earnings call, Dimon referred to the incident as a
“tempest in a teapot,” and Braunstein made possibly
misleading statements.

April 16

JPM provided to the OCC, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and Federal Reserve a 13-page written
presentation about the SCP book, which was the first written
response to the matter given by the bank to its regulators.

April 20

SCP had collateral disputes with 10 different counterparties,
involving $690 million. The largest dispute was with Morgan
Stanley.

April 25

JPM senior management ordered the Investment Bank’s own
Valuation Control Group to test SCP’s March 30 marks for
accuracy and to evaluate CIO VCG’s review of those marks.

April 28

The Controller’s office began a special assessment of CIO’s
month-end profit-and-loss figures for the first quarter.

May

The JPMorgan Chase Management Task Force (JPM Task
Force) was formed to investigate the reasons for the CIO
losses and to suggest remedies.
Mismarking ended after Ashley Bacon (JPM Deputy Chief Risk
Officer) ordered CIO to mark the SCP positions the same as the
Investment Bank, which used an independent pricing service.

May 4

Braunstein and Hogan telephoned the OCC Examiner-inCharge of JPM to inform him that the SCP had lost $1.6 billion
thus far in the second quarter.
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May 10

JPM finalized its first-quarter financial results in a Form 10-Q
filing with the SEC. The bank reported the same net income of
$5.383 billion on total net revenue of $26.712 billion that it
had released in the Form 8-K of April 13. However, JPM did
make certain significant changes to the disclosures pertaining
to CIO between the 8-K and the 10-Q.
By this time, the JPM Task Force discovered errors in the new
CIO VaR model that incorrectly reduced CIO VaR. JPM went
back to the old model, revised average first-quarter CIO VaR
from $67 million to $129 million, but made no mention in the
Form 10-Q filing of the reason for the change.
The Controller’s special assessment memorandum
determined that CIO “properly reported” $719 million in total
losses at March 31, instead of the $1.2 billion that would have
been reported if midpoint pricing had been used, and that CIO
had acted “consistent with industry practices.”

May 13

Drew resigned.

Late May

Collateral disputes between CIO and its counterparties
generally ended.

June

JPM officials began doubting the SCP marks, when the JPM
Task Force uncovered evidence that traders were criticizing
their reported marks.

July

Goldman resigned.

July 12

JPM terminated the employment of Iksil, his superior MartinArtajo, and Martin-Artajo’s superior Macris. JPM suspended
Grout, who later resigned.

July 13

JPM restated its first-quarter earnings, reducing consolidated
total net revenue by $660 million from $26.712 billion to
$26.052 billion, which in turn reduced after-tax net income by
$459 million from $5.383 billion to $4.924 billion.

October

Weiland resigned. Zubrow announced that he would resign
from JPM, effective February 2013.

November
6

The OCC issued six Supervisory Letters to JPM, with 20
Matters Requiring Attention that the bank needed to correct.
The bank did not dispute the findings or the
recommendations.

December
31

Year-to-date SCP losses = $6.2 billion.
Braunstein stepped down as JPM Chief Financial Officer.

January

The OCC filed a Cease and Desist Order against JPM, directing
it to correct deficiencies in its derivatives trading activity.
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January 16

The JPM Task Force issued its report.

April 1

FSA replaced by the Prudential Regulation Authority and the
Financial Conduct Authority.

August 14

The SEC and Justice Department charged Martin-Artajo and
Grout with fraud.

SeptemberOctober

Four regulators in the US and one in the UK reached
settlement agreements with JPM, totaling $1.020 billion in
penalties.

December
10

The Federal Reserve System, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, OCC,
and SEC issued the final Volcker Rule.
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Appendix 2: JPM Partial Organizational Chart

Source: US Senate Exhibits, 28.
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